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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JERRY ARTHUR VVHITE, 
Plaintif {-Respondent, 
vs. 
NICOLE EDITH WHITE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
12960 . 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE.l\IJ1JNT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an action for a divorce in which the plain-
tiff sought a division of the marital estate and the 
custody of the parties' only child, Nicolette White. The 
defendant counterclaimed seeking a decree of divorce, 
a division of the marital estate, the custody of the 
parties' only child, Nicolette vVhite, child support, ali-
mony and attorney's fees. 
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DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
The court awarded the plaintiff a divorce on 
grounds of mental cruelty, the care and custody of the 
parties' only child, Nicolette "\Vhite, on the grounds 
that the defernlant was an unfit mother, and denied the 
defendant's request for alimony and attorney's fees. 
The defendant appeals from those portions of the De-
cree of Divorce which awarded the plaintiff the divorce 
and the care and custody of the parties' only child, Nico-
lette "\Vhite. 
HELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Decree of Divorce 
awarded jointly to both parties. the custody of the 
parties' only chikl, Nicolette "r'hite awarded to her, and 
the costs and attorney fees that she has incurred in 
prosecuting this appeal awanle(l to her. 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and respondent were married 011 June 
13, HH:i-t, in Twenty-Xine Palms, California. (T.T. 
iO) * One child, Nicolette "Thite, was born to the parties 
on FebruarY 23. 1968. (T.'J'. :3). On or about August 
10, 1 !lil, r~sponclent filed a Complaint in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, seeking a Decree of Di-
*(1~ote: T.T. refers to the Trial Transcript) 
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vorcc m1 gromuls of mental cruelty and praying for an 
awanl to him of the care and custody of the parties 
011 ly child, Nicolette "Thite. The defendant counter-
claime<l seeking a Decree of Divorce on grounds of ~ 
mental cruelty and praying, among other things, for the 
award of Nicolette's custody. 
The case came on for trial before the Honorable 
l\I erriJl C. Faux, District Judge of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on April 25 and 
2G, rn72. On l\lay 26, 1972, the Court entered its Find-
i11gs of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Decree of 
Dirnrce and made the following determinations: ( 1) re-
spondent was entitled to a divorce on grounds of mental 
cruelty; ( 2) appellant's morals were "repulsive to the 
sta11dard in this comrmrnity"; and (3) due to appellant's 
morals it would be "in the best interests of the minor 
child of the parties to award the care, custody and con-
trol of the minor child" to respondent. ( F.F. 2) * 
The evidence does not, however, support to any 
degree the court's determinations of either fact or law. 
"That uncontradicted evidence does indicate is that ap-
pellant is a model mother who has never neglected or 
abused her child. ( T.T. 71). In fact, appellant had been 
ahle, clue to her educational achievements and ability, to 
secure a job that provided her and her child with a com-
fortable living ($700.00/month) while working only 
IG-18 hours per week, thus minimizing the amount of 
*(Note: F.F. refers to the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law) 
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time that she had to spend away from her chil<l ( T.T. 
4;)-.')()). In fact, she spent even less time than this away 
from X icolette since 4-6 hours of her working time 
were actually spent at home preparing lessons and cor-
recting papers. ( T.'l'. J.f3). Finally, in order to insure 
that X icolette would be properly cared for during what 
little time ~he had to spend away from her, appellant 
had engaged an ol<ler, mature woman, who had been ap-
pron~d hy county authorities to care for young children, 
to care for Xicolette during her absenses. ( T.T. 4G). 
In contrast to this the record reflects only that re-
spornlcnt had a goml relationship with Nicolette; it is 
silent as to his personal ability to care for her. (T.'f. 
11). 
The reeord does shnw, however, that respondent 
had committed a<lultery at least once and that this had 
O('curre<l prior to the separation of the parties in the 
s11111111er of H>7J. ( T.T. 55-56). Even more important, 
respondent throughout the last few years of the parties' 
marriage Juul repeatedly threatened appellant's life. 
(T.'l'. ;)':.?-5:3). In fad, the day before the trial, re-
spondent told appellant that she "was )ucky to he alive; 
that he had spared .. [her].'' (T.'f. 5:3). Furthermore, 
respondent at various times physically as well ~s 
verbalk threatened appellant. ( T.T . . 5:3-54). In adch-
tion, r~spondent often mldressed appellant in a vile and 
filthy manner. (T.'l'. 53). 
:Moreover, respondent had been a heavy user of a 
wi<le variety of dangerous and illegal drugs at various 
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ti1ncs during the course of the parties' marriage. He ad-
mitted for example to having usecl marijuana, ampheta-
mines, harbituates, and methaclrine repeatedly over a 
m1111bcr of years. (T.T. 9a & 9<>). MoroYer, respondent's 
job rccp1ires him to work at least thirty hours per wee!.\ 
for which he only recei\'es $tLH./hour, and he spends 
additional time, up to ten ( 10) hours per week, away 
from home attending to school work. ( T.T. 87). Not 
only do respondent's personal circumstances dictate 
that he spend well O\ er twice as much time away from 
X icolette than appellant's circumstances require, th<~ ,, 
people with whom he has arranged to place Nicolet((· 
during his absence are notably lacking in qualifications 
for such a high trust. The husband of this couple is a 
nineteen year old, sometimes employed "long hair." 
( T.T. 114-115). The mother is herself only a child of 
se,·enteen. (T.T. 114). Needless to say, this couple 
cloes not have any certification by any governmental 
hod y attesting to their fitness to care for young chil-
dren. (T.T. 114). 
Insofar as appellant's morals are concerned, the 
evidence in<licates only that appellant had relations with 
two different men on several different occasions. (T.T. 
5-G & 22) . Moreover, both of these involvements occur-
recl after the onset of the difficulties between the 
parties. ( T.T. 52-53, 67-68, and 78-79). There is ab-
solutelv no eYidence in the record that indicates in any 
fashio~ that appellant ever conducted herself improper-
ly with a man in front of her child. 
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The evidence, rnorem'er, clearly establishes that 
appellant was not a heavy drug user but rather had onlv 
smoked marijuana twice and hashish once and had onl~ 
taken a hallucenogenic drug, psilocybin, once. All of' 
these instances had occurred approximately nine months 
before the trial and ha,·e never been repeated. (T.T. 
4:3) . The evidence also establishes without contradiction 
that appellant rarely consumes alcohol and then only 
wine as a beverage wi~h a meal. ('f.T. 43). 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
TIIE COURT CLEARLY ABUSED 
ITS DISCHE'l'IO"N" IN A 'V ARD ING 
TILE DIVORCE TO RESPONDENT 
RATHER T II AN TO BOTH RE-
SPONDENT AND APPELLANT 
JOINTLY. 
A. The trial court abused its discretion in 
foiling to grant the divorce to both parties 
under circumstances where the facts indi-
cate that both parties are equally at fault. 
In iJlullins v. ft-lullins, 26 Utah 2d 82, 485 P.2d 
663, ()64 ( 1971), the Utah Supreme Court stated as 
follows: 
"There seems to be nothing in our statute or 
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in logic that would prevent a dissolution of this 
marriage by granting a divorce to both, where 
the facts fault each equally as respect to 
grounds therefor ... " 
B. The determination of what constitutes 
mental cmelty must be made from the 
facts of each case. 
In Stet'enson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah 2d 153, 369 
P .2d 923 ( 1962), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirm~d 
a long line of cases extending back to Doe v. Doe, 46 
Utah 200, 158 P. 781 (1916), in holding as follows: 
"'Vhether defendant's conduct was cruel and 
whether it caused plaintiff to suffer great 
mental distress, can only be determined in 
light of the sensibility of this particular plain-
tiff. Persons' sensibilities may vary due to 
their different degrees of intelligence, refine-
ment, delicacy of health, etc. For this reason, 
the same conduct may constitute mental cruel-
ty in one case and not in another. The ultimate 
answer depends not so much on defendant's 
conduct, but rather on the effect such conduct 
had upon the plaintiff." 369 P.2d at 923. 
The trial court in that case had refused to grant 
the plaintiff wife a divorce on grounds of mental cruel-
ty where the wife had among other things established 
that her husband had treated her like a slave, expecting 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
her to serve his every need, had falsely accused her of 
marital infidelity, and had falsely acct;sed her of being 
mentally ill. The court held that these facts, coupled 
with the evidence that the plaintiff greatly feared her 
husband. constituted a sufficient showing of mental 
cmelty to warrant the granting of a divorce and on re-
marnl directed the trial court to enter a decree in plain-
tiff's favor. Hfin P.2d at !):2.J.-25. 
In .loh11.w11 i:'. .lohnson, 107 Utah 147, 152 P.2d 
42() ( l!H4), the court affirmed the award of a <lh'orce 
to the plaintiff wife \vherein the evidence adduced at 
triitl established that the defendant had called the plain-
tiff. at times i11 the presence of their children, vile and 
abusive names, had accused her of marital infidelity 
ancl had once, without 1n·ovocation, beat one child over 
the head with his fist in her presence. The wife had al-
leged that this conduct on the defendant's part had 
('aused her mental pain and suffering. 152 P.2d at ,J.27. 
In Curr.11 v. Curr!J, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P.2d 930 
( U);j8), the husband was awarded the divorce but the 
wife was awarded the custody of their children. The 
husband on appeal claimed first that he should have 
heen awarded the children since he was awarded the 
divorce. hut the Court rejected this argument. I-le then 
argued that he only wanted the divorce if he could keep 
the children and, since the trial court had awarded the 
children to his wife, he would waive the decree of di-
vorce that had been awarded to him if the Supreme 
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Court proved unwilling to award the children to him. 
An integral part of his argument in this regard was 
that only he had grounds for divorce and that the trial 
court had so found by awarding the divorce to him. The 
Supreme Court answered this argument by finding that 
the trial court could have awarded his ,\,ife the divorce 
on the evidence contained in the record that was before 
it. The Court in assessing this evidence first noted that 
the rule in Utah was that the showing of mental cruelty 
which a complainant had to make in order to be entitled 
to a divorce varied with the sensibilities of each com-
plainant and the facts and circumstances of each case. 
l t then reviewed the evidence in the record which showed 
that the husband was very antagonistic towards or-
ganized religion unlike either his wife or his children, 
that he had acted in a very superior and condescending 
manner towards both his wife and children, and that he 
had accused his wife of marital infidelities. The Court 
held that on this record the wife would have been en-
titled to an award of the divorce if the trial court had 
so chosen since even a person of ordinary sensibilities 
would suffer severe mental anguish and distress as a 
result of the husband's attitudes, conduct and actions as 
set forth above. 321 P.2d at 742-43. 
C. From a review of the record m the in-
stant case it is clear that appellant is no 
more responsible for the dissolution of the 
marriage than respondent. 
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ln the instant case, the record is clear that the ap-
pellant possessed more than adequate grounds for di-
vorce. Hespornlent had himself at least once committed 
adultery. ( T.T. 55-~36). This fact by itself had caused 
appellant a great deal of pain and suffering. (T.T. 67-
()8). Even more important, respondent throughout the 
last few years of the parties' marriage had repeatedly 
threatened appellant's life. ( T.'J'. 52-5:3). In fact, the 
clay before the trial, respondent told appellant that she 
"was lucky to be alive; that he had spared .. [her]." 
( T.T. 53). All of these facts are uncontradicted and 
have never been denied by respondent .. l\Ioreover, re-
spondent at various times physically as well as verbally 
threatenecl appellant. ( T.'l'. 5H-54). In fact, appellant 
testified that for several months after the incident at 
her apartment in Sall Lake City over the 1971 Thanks-
gi,·in<r holi<lays when respondent, lrithout permission 
entered her apartment and assaulted l\Ir. Issel (T.T. 
88-:J\,, & !)()), she lived in constant fear of bodily 
harm from respo11clent. ( 'f .'!'. 54). Digressing for a 
moment, several other things should also be noted about 
this episode: First, respondent was not living with ap-
pellant at the time this incident occurred. I-le had moved 
out earlier awl was then living at 1143 East Ninth 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah. ( T.'f. 9-11). Second, re-
spondent's violent conduct so frightened appellant that 
she called the police. ( 'l'.T. 39). 
Respondent uot only verbally and physically 
threatened appellant's physical well being, he also quite 
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often wldrcssed her in a Yile, coarse manner. He, for 
example, has often called her a "bitch" and a "slut" 
' ( T.T. 5:3) a practice which he initiated far in advance 
of any infidelity on appellant's part. (T.T. 66). 
Finally, respondent throughout the course of the 
parties' marriage continually attempted to stifle appel-
lant's educational goals and desires and sought to haYe 
her subordinate her needs and aspirations to that of his 
own. ( T.T. 50-;32, 63 & 75-76). Hespondent did not, for 
example, approve of appellant taking one or h\;o 
classes, let alone a full load. (T.T. 63). Respondent's 
stated reason for 11ot wanting appellant to further her 
education was that it prevented her from taking proper 
care of Nicolette. ( T.T .. 51). That this was not the true 
reason for his feelings is revealed by the fact that he 
expected her to work at a job in order to provide them 
with a liYing. (T.T. 53). Appellant in fact worked con-
sistently to support them, apparently without any ob-
jedion from respondent, while respondent was in 
school, both as, an undergraduate (T.T. 35) and as a. 
gracluate student ( T.T. 36). Respondent's true con-
cerns about his daughter is also reflected by the fact 
thnt between December 1, 1971, and the date of trial, 
April 25, 1972, a period of almost five months, respon-
dent contributed a grand total of five dollars ($5.00) 
towards Nicolette's support. (T.T. 69) · 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
HEYEHSIBLE ERROR BY rnVARD-
ING 'l'IIJ~ CUSTODY OF TI-IE CIIILD 
TO HESPONDENT AND BY NOT 
A 'V ARDING SAID CUSTODY TO AP-
PELLANT. 
A. Divorce actions are equitable in nature 
and on appeal the Supreme Court has the 
authority to review the record de nova and 
to substitute its OWH judgment for that of 
the trial court if in its judgment the trial 
court committed a clear abuse of discre-
tion or if the trial court's judgment is 
against a clear preponderance of the evi-
dence. 
The Utah Supreme Conrt has long held that it 
possesses the power in an equitable action such as a 
divorce to review the record de nova and to render its 
own judgment thereon if it belie\'es that the trial court 
has committed a clear abuse of discretion ( JJT ilson v. 
1Vilson, 5 Utah 2d 7!l, 84<, 2~)() P .2d 977 ( 1956) ) , or 
if it believes that the trial court's judgment is contrary 
to a clear preponderance of the evidence. 111 acDonald v. 
1llaclJonald, l:W Utah .37B, 2BG P.2d lOHG ( 1951). 
As the following discussion will reveal, the trial 
court's findings that appellant is morally unfit to have 
Xicolette's custody and that Nicolette's best interests 
would be served by a warding her custody to respondent 
are contrary to a clear preponderance of the evidence. 
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l\Ioreover, this discussion will also reveal that the trial 
court plainly abused its discretion by awarding Nicolette 
to respondent. 
B. Under Utah Law the presumption is "that 
the mother is best suited to care for young 
children." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 
(Supp. 1971) 
In Dearden v. Dearden, 15 Utah 2d 105, 388 P.2d 
:mo ( 1 !W4) the Court held that there was a "universally 
recoginzed presumption that it is for the best interests 
and welfare of a child of such tender years to be with 
her mother." 15 Utah 2<l at 108. The Comt then stated 
that, 
"the mother's right to custody should not be 
denied unless it is shown that she is such an im-
moral, incompetent or otherwise improper per-
son that it would be contrary to the child's best 
interest and welfare to he in her custody." 15 
Utah 2d 108-109; Accord, Chase v. Chase, 15 
Utah 2d 81, 83, 387 P.2d .556 (1963) (There 
must be "some substantial and compelling 
reason to deprive her [the mother J of . . · 
[the child's] custody.") 
It should be noted that the language quoted above 
from the Dearden decision is completely in accord with 
th~ standard set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 
30-3-10 (Supp. 1971) which section was amended by the 
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legislature in lHGH, to make it specifically apply to di-
nn:cc aetions. It should also be note<l that in Briggs v. 
Bnp;,t.!,·s. 111 Utah 418, 181 P.2d 22H, 228 (l!J47), the 
Utah Supreme Court set forth the requirements of this 
statute (which has not been substantively changed since 
that decision with the exception, as noted above, that it 
is now applicable to divorce actions) as follows: 
"Under this statute the mother is entitled to the 
custody of the child unless is is made to appear 
to the contrary. Thus the burden of convincin()' • 0 
the court is on the fa th er. 'Ve must also keep 
in mind that ordinarily no one can take the 
place of a mother in the life of a girl of this 
age." 181 P.2<1 at 228 
C. The critical issue in determining whether 
a mother is morally unfit to have the 
custody of her child is whether her conduct 
is of such a nature as to hazard the child's 
welfare and render it unwise that the 
child he placed in her mother's custody. 
In the Dearden case, supra the tiral court awarded 
both the divorce to the husband (on the grounds of 
mental cruelty) and the custody of the parties' 2 Yz year 
ol<l daughter after finding that the mother was morally 
unfit to have the custody of her daughter. The trial 
court based this finding on the fact that the husband's 
evidence indicated that the mother had engaged in an 
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acl11ltcro11s course of conduct, extending over a several 
J11onth period of time, with another man. The Utah Su-
preme Court emphatically rejected these findings as a 
basis for denying the mother the custody of the child, 
stating first that: 
"It is generally held that such misconduct as 
fournl against plaintiff, although of course 
censurahle ancl not to be condoned, will not 
necessarily of itself deprive a parent of her 
child. Social ideas have changed, considerably 
since the time of the 'East Lynne' concept 
when for moral transgression a wife was cast 
into outer darkness and deprived of all, includ-
ing her children." l;3 Utah 2d at 107 
See also, Stuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah GH2, 244 P.2d 650, 
ti;)2 ( In52) where the Court stated: "The fact that she 
li\·ed with a man whom she expected to many, although 
c·cnsurahlc, does not in itself make her an unfit and 
improper person to have the custody of her child."; 
and Bal~cr v. Bal.:cr. 25 Utah 2d 337, 481 P.2d 672 
( rn11) 
The Court in Dearden then stated the applicable 
standard as follows: 
"The critical question for consideration is 
whether the conduct shown is of such a nature 
as to hazard her [the child's] welfare and make 
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it unwise that she be in her mother's custody." 
15 Utah 2d at 107 
The Court then held, having assumed that the trial 
court's finding that the mother was guilty of adulterv 
was ndicl, that there was no indication . 
"of anything base or depraved or erratic in 
plaintiff's attitude toward or treatment of her 
daughter or in her relationship with her. On 
the contrary, there was testimony that the 
plaintiff was a 'fine housekeeper' and a 'very 
good mother.' The trial court found that the 
plaintiff was 'a neat and orderly housekeeper' 
and there is no evidence that she has directly 
or intentionally mistreated the child." 15 Utah 
2d at 108. 
That the Court's central concern in cases involving 
a claim that the mother is morally unfit to have the 
custody of her child is whether or not the mother's con-
duct directly affects both her relationship with her child 
and the care and treatment which she provides the child 
is made manifestly clear by the Court's explication of 
its decision in lllcBroom v. JJJcJJroom, 14 Utah 2d 393, 
384 P.2d 961 ( 1963) in its opinion in Dearden, supra. 
In the 111 cJJ room case the trial court awarded the divorce 
to the husband, hut the custody of the parties' two chil-
dren to the wife. The husband appealed and the Su-
preme Court reversed the lower court's custody award 
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on the grounds that the children's best interests would 
he sened thereby. The evidence upon which the Court 
based its decision indicated among other things that she 
had been 
"persistently guilty of indiscretions, includ-
ing leaving the home on numerous occasions 
and staying out until the small hours of the 
morning. The circumstances shown indicate[d] 
to a practical certainty that she was in an im-
proper relationship with a married man ... " 
14 Utah 2d at p. mw. 
The e\'iclence in the 1llcBroum case also indicated that 
the wife often came home in the early hours of the morn-
ing under the influence of alcohol, and unable to prop-
erly care for the children. It also showed that she used 
vile language in front of the children and left salacious 
and obscene material around the house in places easily 
accessible to the children. Moreover, it further indicated 
that she often refused to engage in various activities 
with the children. Furthermore, there was evidence to 
the effect that she "·'US a poor housekeeper who didn't 
prepare proper meals for her family and there was also 
evidence to the effect that she had, during the pendeucy 
of the appeal, attempted to alienate the children's af-
fection toward their father and had punished them 
whenever they had any contact with him. Finally, there 
was evidence to the ef feet that the mother had arranged 
to leave the children with "babysitters" during the day 
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time when the ehilclren weren't in school. The hushancl 
on the other hand had arranged for his mother to care 
for the children in his absence in the event the court 
awarded the children to him. 14 Utah 2d at 396-97. 
From a reading of the Court's opinion in lJicBroom, 
as a whole, it appears clear that its decision to reverse 
the trial court and award the children to the husband 
was not based upon the wife's sexual misconduct but 
rather on the fact that the evidence clearly indicated 
that she was a poor mother, from whom the children 
received substandard treatment. 'Vhatever doubt may 
exist in this regard due to the Court's recitation of her 
sexual misconclnct along with the rest of the evidence 
was laid to rest by the Supreme Court in the Dearden 
case, .rn pra. The husband there relied heavily on the 
11/cBroom decision as a basis for his appeal. The Court, 
however, held that the husband's reliance was misplaced 
because "while immorality was involved [in that case], 
erratic behavior was manifest in the [wife's] attitude 
toward and treatment of the children which was deemed 
to ha,.;anl their [the children's] welfare." 15 Utah 2d at 
] 08, ll. 4. 
Of added significance is the fact that despite, in 
.1.llclJroom, the mother's gross neglect of and inatten-
tion to her parental responsibilities and obligations as 
established by the evidence in that case, the Supreme 
Court still directed the district court to review the 
custody award two years from the date of its remittitur 
of the. case to the district court. 14 Utah 2d at 398. 
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In the instant case there is no indication whatso-
C\'er that appellant's sexual cornluct has ever been "of 
s11eh a nature as to hazard ... [the child's] welfare and 
rnake it m1wise that she be in her mother's custody" 
Dearden, supra, 15 Utah 2d at 107. The record is in 
fact barren of any evidence that appellant has ever con-
ducted herself in an improper manner in front of her 
child. The evidence uniformly does show, however, that 
appellant has always been a wonderful mother. Re-
spondent in fact testified on direct examination by his 
own attorney as follows: 
Q. During the time that you and _l\Irs. White 
were residing together as man and wife, 
did you have occasion to observe how she 
took care of and treated your daughter? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. In your opinion, did she ever fail to prop-
erly bathe and clean your daughter? 
A. No. 
Q. In your opinion, did she ever fail to prop-
erly feed your daughter? 
A. No. 
Q. She prepared meals, correctly? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In your opinion, did she ever fail to prop-
erly clothe the child? 
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A. No sir. 
(~. She keep a dirty house? 
.A. No sir. (T.T. 71). 
l\l<>reover, Barbara Dmm Lancaster, a witness who was 
callc1l on hchalf of the appellant, testified, after having 
testified that she had known both of the parties for 
many years (T.T. 99), that she had worked as both a 
fourth grade teacher and as a teacher in the Ileaclstart 
program (T.T. 103), that she had tended Nicolette for 
appellant on numerous occasions (T.T. 99) and that 
she had obse1Tcd appellant arnl Nicolette together at 
least ~08 different times ( T.'l'. 103), that in her opin-
ion, based on her experience with children, and the 
familiarity which she had both with appellant and Nico-
lette and their relationship, appellant was "definitely" 
a "fit and proper mother." ( T.T. 104). She then stated 
that "if there teas milJmze that I wonld be delighted to 
111odcl as a mother, it would be Nicole [appellant]" 
(T~T. 104). (Emphasis added) 
In addition to these facts, uncontradicted evidence 
also indicates that appellant had arranged her employ-
ment prior to the trial of this action so that she would 
be away from Xicolette no more than 14 hours per 
week . .'.\Joreover, she had secured an older, mature, coun-
ty appnffe<l woman to care for Nicolette during the 
time that she was required to spend away from her. 
( T.T. 56). In contrast to this, respondent's employment 
and school work required him to be away from Nico-
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lette between HO and 40 hours per week. (T.T. 87). 
~loreover, the people that he secure<l to care for Nico-
lette during his absences do not appear to Le well quali-
fiecl for the job. The husband is only nineteen years 
old and apparently does not lmve a stable employment 
record. ( T.T. 114). Respondent in fact admitted that 
he could be characteri'./,ed as a "long hair." ( T.T. 114-
115). His wife, who is most responsible for caring for 
Nicolette is hut herself a child of seventeen years of 
age. ( T.T. 114) .. 1\Ioreover, neither of these persons 
has been approved hy any govemmental agency or body 
as being fit to care fOL' young children. ( T. T. 114). 
One final factor is worthy of note in this appeal. 
A review of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law, and especially the statements and ob-
servations that the court made throughout the course 
of trial (see 'l'.T. 91-92, 12,J.-26 & 130) reveals that the 
court is of the view that "the 'East Lynne' concept when 
for moral transgression a wife was cast into outer dark-
ness ancl dep1fred of all, including her children," is still 
a viable rule of law in Utah. As this Court made quite 
clear in Dearden, however, that view or rule of law has 
been completely discarded and abandoned for all time 
hy the Utah courts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully re-
quested that the Court set aside both the trial court's 
award of the divorce to respondent and the trial court's 
------
- - --
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a warcl of Nicolette to respondent and exercise the 
authority which it has in a divorce action to review the 
record de no'l'o, JJril.wn 'l'. TVilson, supra; an<l T:Vicse v. 
JV icsc, 24 Utah 2d 2an, 2H8, 4()9 P .2d 504 ( 1970) and 
decree its own judgment awarding both appellant and 
responclent the divorce and awarding Nicolette's perma-
nent custody to appellant. In the alternative, appellant 
requests that the judgment of the district court award-
ing the divorce and the custody of Nicolette 'Vhite to 
respondent be reversed and that the same be remanded 
to the trial court with directions to enter a decree of di-
vorce in the names of both parties and to award Nico-
lette's custody to appellant. 
Appellant has incurred substantial costs and attor-
ney fees in prosecuting this appeal an<l respectfully re-
quests that the Court award her costs and her attorney 
fees in an amount to be set by the Court. 
DATED this ________ day of ------------------------· 1972. 
Respectfully submitted 
YAX COTT, BAGLEY, 
COHN'V ALL & :l\IcCARTHY 
Stephen D. Swindle 
Robert :K. 'Veatherbee 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Suite 300, 141 East l<-,irst South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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